Prenda Law Tries To Close The Barn Door After The Horse Has Lawyered Up
Yesterday, March 14, as Judge Wright was busy issuing a new Order to Show Cause directing Prenda Law clients and affiliated attorneys to appear before him, Prenda Law was busy too.
More specifically, Prenda Law — through Paul Duffy, one of the lawyers Judge Wright has ordered to appear — was busy dismissing cases and filing a "Notice of Allegations" informing other courts of what is going on. Sort of.
A tipster told me that Mr. Duffy had a busy day yesterday. PACER showed it's true. More specifically, Mr. Duffy filed voluntary dismissals of multiple AF Holdings LLC cases in the Northern District of Illinois — here and here and here (in which he stipulated to dismiss the case with prejudice, meaning it can't be re-filed) and here. In one of those cases he filed the notice of dismissal even though AF Holdings had already secured a default against the defendant, leaving nothing but proving damages. I haven't yet counted all the cases in which Duffy filed dismissals yesterday.
In each of those cases — and in a case in the Northern District of California — Duffy also filed a substantially identical document styled a "Notice of Allegations." Here's what they all say:
Plaintiff hereby notifies the Court of allegations of forgery that were made during a hearing in a matter pending before the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California. Ingenuity13 LLC v. John Doe, No. 2:12-cv-08333-OWD-JC (C.D. Cal. Mar. 11, 2013). On March 11, 2013, an individual by the name of Alan Cooper alleged that his signature was forged on two separate agreements assigning the rights of various copyrighted works to Plaintiff, including the assignment at issue in this matter. (See, ECF No. 1-2 at 2.) Plaintiff categorically denies Mr. Cooper’s allegations, which arise nearly two years after certain of the alleged conduct occurred. Mr. Cooper has a pecuniary interest in his allegations by virtue of a lawsuit he filed against Plaintiff. Cooper v. Steele, et al., No. 27-CV-13-3463 (Minn. Dist. Ct., Hennepin Cty., 2013).
Even if Mr. Cooper’s allegations were true—and they are not—Plaintiff’s assignments, including the assignment at issue in the instant action, remain valid. The formal requirements of a copyright assignment are “quite simple”: a writing signed by the assignor. 17 U.S.C. § 204; Effects Associates, Inc. v. Cohen, 908 F.2d 555, 557 (9th Cir. 1990) (“The rule is really quite Case: 1:12-cv-03567 Document simple: If the copyright holder agrees to transfer ownership to another party, that party must get the copyright holder to sign a piece of paper saying so. It doesn't have to be the Magna Charta; a one-line pro forma statement will do.”); see also Order, AF Holdings LLC v. Does 1-96, No. 11-cv-3335-JSC (N.D. Cal. Nov. 22, 2011), ECF No. 29 at 5 n.1 (“The written copyright assignment recites that it is between the original copyright owner, Heartbreaker Films, and Plaintiff here, AF Holdings, LLC. . . . As the law requires only that the assignment be signed by the assignor and not the assignee, this inconsistency does not prevent a prima facie showing of copyright ownership.”) (internal citations omitted).
Mr. Cooper’s allegations relate to the assignee, not the assignor. The assignment at issue in this action satisfies the Copyright Act’s formal requirements. It is a writing signed by the assignor. Plaintiff’s rights in the copyrighted work in this action were transferred when the assignor executed the assignment.
Plaintiff is treating Mr. Cooper’s allegations with utmost seriousness and is investigating their substance. Because Mr. Cooper’s allegations relate to the assignment agreement at issue in the instant litigation, Plaintiff respectfully brings the matter to the Court’s attention.
Broken down, here's what Duffy is saying: (1) Cooper's claim is untrue, (2) but we're treating the claim seriously and investigating it, (3) but even if it were true, it doesn't matter, because an assignment only needs a valid signature from the person giving the property, not the person receiving the property.
Many things could be said about that argument. Among them: the first two points are oddly at war with each other, particularly when uttered in such proximity. If AF Holdings knows the allegation is not true, then what precisely is AF Holdings carefully investigating? Doesn't AF Holdings already know whether or not Mr. Cooper consented to be an officer for it and executed documents for it? What is there to investigate, exactly?
Duffy's third point is about a doctrine that lawyers — including, for instance, prosecutors and defense lawyers — call materiality. Most civil or criminal laws prohibiting false statements only extend to material false statements — that is, statements that are the sort that could make a difference in the issue at hand. Duffy seems to be previewing Prenda Law's defense by suggesting that even if Cooper's identify was misappropriated and his signature forged on assignments, that false statement was not material because a copyright assignment only needs a valid signature from the guy giving the copyright, not the guy receiving it.
There are a number of problems with that argument. Among them: Judge Wright is not only interested in whether Prenda Law made fraudulent representations about who received the assignments. Judge Wright is investigating — and has ordered Prenda Law to explain — whether Prenda Law made fraudulent representations about the true owners of plaintiff entities like AF Holdings. Whether Alan Cooper is a real officer or not is unquestionably material to that. Judge Wright has specifically ordered them to explain:
2) Why they should not be sanctioned for failing to notify the Court of all parties that have a financial interest in the outcome of litigation;
3) Why they should not be sanctioned for defrauding the Court by misrepresenting the nature and relationship of the individuals and entities in subparagraphs a–m above [of the March 14, 2013 Order];
Prenda Law's apparent theory of materiality may be apt in analyzing whether the copyright assignments are valid. But it may not be apt in determining whether any misstatements were material for purposes of civil or criminal fraud allegations directed at the ownership and management of Prenda Law's clients. For instance, as I've discussed before, for purposes of charging defendants with false statements to the government, materiality is defined very broadly to include the sorts of statements that have the capacity to influence the government, whether or not the government is actually misled.
All that said, aside from questions about the exact language of the "Notice of Allegations," Paul Duffy is very likely doing the right thing legally and ethically by dismissing the cases and informing courts of the allegations against Prenda Law. In doing so he is reducing the risk that he will be accused of continuing any alleged fraud on the court after the March 11, 2013 hearing.
With respect to what has already happened, though — my friends, that die is cast, the Rubicon crossed, the ram has touched the wall.
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