There are many federal criminal statutes susceptible to frighteningly broad interpretation. One of them, as I've suggested before, is the federal computer fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. section 1030. It can be interpreted to make it a federal crime to violate your employer's computer use policies (for instance, by reading Popehat at work) or to violate a web site's terms of use, however obscure. That's exactly the argument the feds made in their prosecution of Lori Drew, which was ultimately unsuccessful. This is some of the problematical language of the statute:
a) Whoever—
. . . .
(2) intentionally accesses a computer without authorization or exceeds authorized access, and thereby obtains—
. . . .
(C) information from any protected computer;
Since "protected computer" means any computer in or affecting interstate commerce (any computer connected to the internet, basically), this can be read to criminalize logging onto a site beyond "authorized access" and getting information — including, hypothetically, registering for Facebook with any false information and getting information online from Facebook as a result.
The danger is not that the government will prosecute everyone who lies about their weight on Match.com or lets their 12-year-old register on Facebook or visits Popehat from Canada without sending us donuts. The danger is that the government will selectively prosecute people they don't like — that the government will use this statute to scratch their "there oughta be a law" itch when they are mad at someone who hasn't actually committed a real federal crime.
Fortunately, the government's ambitions have now been thwarted — at least in the Ninth Circuit. In United States v. Nosal, a divided Ninth Circuit panel rejected the broad interpretation of Section 1030 and adopted a narrower approach. I'm in appellate brief Hell, so I won't give you the full rundown. Look instead to Orin Kerr — the victor in the Drew case, who has been sounding the alarm on the dangers of this statute for years — or to Jacob Sullum. The decision — written in typically entertaining fashion by Judge Kozinski — does an excellent job of explaining how a broad interpretation of the statute could criminalize a vast swath of typical behavior. This ruling puts the Ninth Circuit at odds with other Circuits, but to a good end.
Edited to add: Doug's take is well worth reading. And not just because he quotes me.
Last 5 posts by Ken White
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